



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

tests with which the country has had to do since 1856. Here may be found, in large measure, the political history of the last fifty years. Special interest attaches to the conventions and campaigns of 1860, 1864, 1880, and 1884. Light notice is taken, very naturally, of the shortcomings of the party, either of the last generation or of this. But in the record of the party conventions many interesting nominating speeches and party discussions are given, and the proceedings and decisions are set forth by which the evolution of the unwritten party law is revealed. Some readers will be disappointed and surprised that more attention is not given to the development of party machinery and to the importance of party organization, practice, and usage in popular government; for on this line we find one of the most striking characteristics of our party life during the lifetime of the Republican party. The most recent events and issues in our party history are discussed from the Republican point of view, and the volumes may be regarded as a good and useful summary of Republican principles and policies, with the party defenses well and ably guarded.

In his closing chapter, on "Defections from the Party", which is largely a discussion of party ethics, Mr. Curtis makes a plea at length in favor of party fealty and against the spirit of the mugwump. Of the four historic Republican defections, the first, that of 1864, says Mr. Curtis, was "only a flash in the pan"; the second, that of 1872, was a failure that brought only ridicule to its cause and death to its candidate; the third, that of 1884, was based on a false charge, and he condemns its leader, Mr. George William Curtis, as "bound in honor to support the ticket and platform" (II, 472) which he helped to make; the fourth defection, that of the Silver Republicans in 1896, strengthened the party rather than weakened it. The mugwumps, the author declares, have in no way influenced party nominations or the course of party history; to the credit of electing Cleveland, if credit it be and if such credit can be claimed, the author allows the mugwumps to be entirely welcome. Considerable attention is given to Mr. George William Curtis and Mr. Carl Schurz as leaders of mugwump opinion, and severe criticism is meted out to the *Springfield Republican* as a typical mugwump journal, which is characterized as making "untruthful and unjust attacks . . . upon the nation's trusted officers" (II, 481).

The appendix of the work contains a good deal of good party material. Students and readers who are interested in American politics and party history will find cause of gratitude to Mr. Curtis for the result of his labor.

JAMES A. WOODBURN.

The History of Twenty-five Years. By Sir SPENCER WALPOLE, K.C.B. Volume I, 1856-1865; Volume II, 1865-1870. (London and New York: Longmans, Green, and Company. 1904. Two vols., pp. xviii, 529; xiv, 525.)

It is twenty years since Sir Spencer Walpole completed his six-

volume *History of England from 1815 to 1858*, a work to which the present history forms in some sort the sequel. But the author warns his reader that these later volumes aim at covering not merely the history of England but that of continental Europe and the United States between 1856 and 1881. And this gives them a peculiar interest and importance. They have no real competitor in English, for Fyffe's *Modern Europe* is constructed on a much smaller scale, and Mr. McCarthy's *History of Our Own Times* is both too exclusively British and too journalistic to compete either in scope or in style with Sir Spencer's work. The recently advertised history by Mr. Herbert Paul may intend to traverse the same ground, but anybody who is familiar with Mr. Paul's other books will hardly expect from him the large views, the judicial temper, the mellow and deliberate opinions, which make Sir Spencer a historian of unusual excellence.

Walpole's work consists practically of thirteen monographs, varying in length from sixty to one hundred pages, of which seven are directly concerned with British internal affairs, and one each with the union of Italy, with Poland and Denmark, with the American Civil War and the Mexican Empire, with the rise of Prussia, and with the collapse of the French Empire. It is particularly to those non-British chapters that attention should be called, because, so far as I am aware, there is nothing else in English so good, nothing that supplies their place. The account of the union of Italy, for instance, compresses into comparatively small compass diplomatic and political negotiations, many of which have only recently been revealed, which extended over seven years; and, what is more to the purpose, the treatment is as sympathetic as it is clear. So too the chapter on the American Civil War is written with a fine candor. Sir Spencer lays bare the truculence of Palmerston, the supercilious hostility of the British aristocracy toward the North, and the uncertain and often mistaken policy of the British Foreign Office; but he also shows the basis on which British prejudices rested, and the blunders, of which the seizure of Mason and Slidell was the greatest, in the American conduct. Throughout the work, indeed, he describes with scrupulous precision the state of mind which conditioned the acts of each of the parties to a dispute. As a specimen of his skill in disentangling the most snarly skein of modern diplomacy, the chapter on the Schleswig-Holstein affair may be recommended. Possibly, the portion of his history which some readers will concur in least is that which unfolds the rise of Prussia. Sir Spencer describes Bismarck's genius in all its strength, but with its utter ignoring of moral considerations when a political advantage was to be gained for Prussia.

The chapters devoted to Great Britain take up Parliamentary and party development, but they go much deeper than that, for Sir Spencer traces also the progress of inventions, the changes in social and religious ideals, and the altered views of man's relations to the universe which the teachings of Darwin and the evolutionists brought about. The great topics, such as the Reform Bill of 1867 or the Irish Question, are of

course given due attention; but you will find also very interesting accounts of the development of steamships, of the introduction of limited liability, of the construction of the Thames embankment and the metropolitan drainage system, and of the admission of Jews to Parliament. Special mention should be made of a general survey of civilization during the sixth decade of the nineteenth century, and of passages which summarize British conditions about 1860 in a manner recalling Macaulay's famous description of England under Charles II. But most stress should be laid, not upon the accuracy with which Sir Spencer states a case, nor on the abundance of his information, but on his eminently judicial temper, and on his sympathy, which enables him to understand and interpret men who differ absolutely in aims and deeds.

Posterity will in the main, I believe, confirm Sir Spencer's verdicts on the great issues and men that he takes up. But while his general outlines are lifelike, persons may not all agree on the lights and shades. Thus, the somewhat scant credit given to Grant as a commander would be modified if Sir Spencer took sufficiently into account Grant's immense achievement west of the Alleghenies before he commanded the Army of the Potomac. Sir Spencer, like many Americans even, forgets Shiloh and Vicksburg and Chattanooga, and the other work of three campaigns which resulted in wresting the Mississippi valley from the Confederacy. To imply that Grant was only a mediocre general because he pounded away, regardless of slaughter, in the Wilderness, and to forget all his record in the west, is unfair. Relatively, Vicksburg was as difficult to capture as Sebastopol, yet Grant captured it in a fifth of the time and with probably only an eighth of the cost in men and money required by the English and French for Sebastopol. So, too, such a move as Grant's cutting loose from his base revealed in him military qualities of a very high order. Wellington, for example, never equaled that. It is evident that Sir Spencer does not realize that, although the south had a much smaller population than the north, the southern country, with its roadless forests and mountains, its unbridged rivers, and its infrequent towns, made defense easy. Since recent experience showed that it took ten Englishmen to displace one Boer, the tremendous advantage which geography may give to one side in war ought to need no further demonstration. The Confederacy had only one soldier to every three Union soldiers, yet the advantage of position may well have been worth the numerical odds.

Sir Spencer's view of Napoleon III is that which de la Gorce, Ollivier, Thouvenel, and other French historians and memoirists have recently made popular. Instead of the unprincipled Machiavellian whom Kinglake and Hugo painted, we are now shown an amiable dreamer, selfish, indeed, and ready to shed a little blood if it seemed expedient, but on the whole benevolently disposed, and prevented from being a model father of his people by the perverseness of an ungrateful minority. Much stress is now laid on Napoleon's disease, and the date when it is supposed to have rendered him unequal to the task of giving his best talents to governing is set farther and farther back. The work of palliation, if not of

whitewashing, has, I suspect, been overdone; and the final portrait of Napoleon III will display a usurper unscrupulous and merciless when thwarted, but with a not uncommon desire to make people happy when by so doing he could add to his prestige and live more comfortably himself. His recent extenuators may be challenged to cite any act of his in which his first consideration was not the strengthening of his dynasty instead of the good of France. It is now so evident that after 1861 his empire was a bubble, ready to burst at the first pinch, that historians who, like Walpole, state the facts, find it hard to make modern readers realize that down to 1870 Napoleon's contemporaries in the world at large believed him to be really the arbiter of Europe, and that even statesmen behind the scenes acted on that assumption.

To only two other large matters is there space to refer. Sir Spencer thinks that Italy could hardly have been united without Lord John Russell's good-will. Nobody can wish to deprive Lord John of the gratitude which Italians owe to him for his favorable attitude in 1859 and 1860; but to suppose that, even had the Tories remained in office, Cavour would not have succeeded in drawing Napoleon III into the war with Austria, or in annexing Central Italy and Sicily, is to assign undue importance to England's moral support. Cavour knew perfectly well that English cabinets, whether led by Derby or by Palmerston, would never send a single British battalion to help or hinder the Italian cause; and, when the crisis came, Cavour would have gone ahead and risked a diplomatic censure, which would have affected him no more than it did Bismarck in 1864. Cavour and Bismarck were statesmen of such different caliber from that of any of the statesmen who have directed the British Foreign Office that an Englishman may well fail to recognize that they did not make the success of their policy contingent on the Foreign Office's consent.

The second point is the high position as statesman and organizer to which Sir Spencer lifts Jefferson Davis. Southern writers have hitherto extolled the military side of the Confederacy and neglected the political and administrative side, even suggesting that Davis's interference in military matters was a constant source of trouble. Until some Southerner, with the fairness of Mr. Rhodes, writes from full knowledge the history of the Confederacy, most Americans will at least suspend judgment in regard to Jefferson Davis's "great qualities".

In conclusion, it should be said that, although Sir Spencer's work deals primarily with political and social movements in a large impersonal way, it has several admirable characterizations of public men. The analysis of Disraeli, the portrait of Gladstone, the summing up of Palmerston cannot henceforth be overlooked, and there are incidental sketches of many others. The total effect of the history is such that it deserves to rank with Mr. Rhodes's. We may hope that the remaining volumes may soon be completed, and that the publishers will issue a popular edition, congenial to the taste and purses of American readers, who do not understand the English publishers' preference for selling a

few hundred copies at five dollars a volume instead of several thousand copies at two dollars a volume. The two markets are apparently so dissimilar that special provision should be made for supplying the American, especially when a book like Sir Spencer Walpole's is fitted for a large audience.

WILLIAM ROSCOE THAYER.

Abraham Lincoln and his Presidency. By JOSEPH HARTWELL BARRETT, LL.D. (Cincinnati: The Robert Clarke Company. 1904. Two vols., pp. xi, 379; vii, 411.)

THE author of these volumes wrote the biography of Lincoln used for campaign purposes in 1860. He has been studying his subject more or less ever since. He saw Lincoln on various occasions and knew a number of his friends. One might expect, therefore, both of the elements of a good biography: contributions to our specific knowledge of the hero, and a distinct personal impression of him. The volumes give us neither. They have added no facts, which is excusable, after the thorough gleanings that has been made, and they are remarkable for their failure to evoke the personality, whether as private individual, orator, diplomat, father, husband, boy, or man. A biographer need not be an artist to put into his papers a living being. Herndon did it for Lincoln, probably, more vividly than any writer who has followed. Inaccurate in many details, he yet drew a portrait that was Lincoln. Accurate in most details, Mr. Barrett has drawn no portrait at all.

Moreover, the title is not exact. "Abraham Lincoln and the Battles of the Civil War" would describe more justly the contents of the book, which gives an elementary account of almost every important battle in the war, with most of which Lincoln had nothing to do, and gives no idea of the immensely complicated problems, political, military, and personal, with which the President was in constant struggle. In scope, therefore, as in treatment, the book is commonplace. Nor does it have that instinct for evidence which would recommend it to the critical sense. It is of the familiar type which receives with awe the testimony of some reverend individual who once knew somebody who knew Lincoln's parents. A sentence like this, for instance, is enough to take from one at once any remaining seriousness: "The Captain's bearing and his power on this occasion, according to accounts from some of the men in after years, impressed them as almost supernaturally grand" (I, 33). Of course Mr. Barrett is convinced that Lincoln lived "most happily" with his wife until his death — not that it is so very important, historically, whether he did or not, but it expresses the attitude of militant decorum which characterizes the typical commonplace biography of a great man. The treatment of the whole Cameron episode, which is crowded into a very brief space, would give a reader as sharp an idea as any part of the book of the author's fear of not being respectful, if he should happen to express anything with clearness. Of the coarser side of Lincoln's humor Mr.